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 The advent of deep-water oil exploration has increased concern for the 
impact of oil activities on marine environment, especially regarding 
disused or decommissioned facilities offshore. Before the Brent Spar 
incident, which galvanised international efforts to protect the 
environment, international and regional legal instruments on 
decommissioning of offshore oil installations was weak and ineffective 
in protecting the environment from the effect of disused facilities. 
This paper examined the efforts made by international and regional 
actors to remedy the lapses of the pre-Brent Spar legal instruments 
on decommissioning of offshore oil facilities, especially regarding the 
new provisions on environmental protection. The paper concluded 
that the supplementary legal instruments made post-Brent Spar have 
not radically transformed the legal regime on decommissioning of 
offshore oil facilities because contracting states still reserve the 
discretion to permit abandonment of disused facilities. 
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1.  Introduction  
Many states of the world have laid down the groundwork for an agreed normative 
framework intended to govern decommissioning of offshore installations1 at the 
regional and international level.2 These include the United Nations Convention on the 
Continental Shelf (Geneva Convention) 1958, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution 1972 and Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) 1992. These instruments govern 
                                                          
1  Woodliffe, J. (1999). “Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations in European Waters: The 
End of a Decade of Indecision?”, 14 IJCL 101. 
2  Park, P., et al. (2001). “Evolution of International law on the Decommissioning of Oil and Gas 
Installation”, 9 IELTR 199. 
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decommissioning of offshore installations internationally and particularly, in the North 
East Atlantic.3 
Despite this seemingly copious legal regime impacting on the decommissioning 
process of oil facilities, there are obvious shortcomings with the instruments, especially 
in the area of the environment. Thus, although, the Brent Spar incident in the North 
Sea4 accelerated changes in the framework for decommissioning5 with greater 
emphasis on protection of the environment,6 this paper argues that these changes are 
not robust enough as they are largely superficial. The paper is therefore, divided into 
three parts, part one discusses the pre-Brent Spar regime on decommissioning in the 
North East Atlantic; part two examines the Brent Spar incident and the changes it 
introduced in the decommissioning regime in the North East Atlantic adducing 
reasons to show that those changes are largely superficial. Part three, is the conclusion. 
 
2.  The Pre-Brent Spar Regime on Decommissioning 
2.1.  Geneva Convention 1958 
The Geneva Convention 1958 was the first international instrument relating to 
decommissioning. Article 5(5) provides that any offshore installations abandoned or 
disused, must be entirely removed. 
It is worthy of note, that this provision quickly fell into ‘desuetude’,7 owing to the 
impracticability of total removal. From 1987 it became “difficult if not impossible to 
meet”8 the requirements of this provision because of the location of installations in 
deep water where removal was not so easy.9 
 
2.2.  UNCLOS 1982 and IMO Guidelines 1989 
The issue of redundant installations was revisited in UNCLOS 1982,10 which provides 
that: 
Any installation…which are abandoned or disused shall be removed…taking into account 
generally accepted international standards established by a competent international 
organization…appropriate publicity being given to… any installations… not entirely 
removed.11  
The competent international organization referred to in UNCLOS is the International 
Maritime Organization,12 which laid down guidelines for decommissioning.13  
                                                          
3  Paterson, J. (2011). “Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations” in Greg Gordon et al (eds.) 
Oil and Gas Law: Current Practices and Emerging Trends, Dundee University Press, 2nd Ed, p. 238. 
4  Huxham, M., et al. (1999). “Emotion, Science and Rationality: The Case of Brent Spar”, 8 Environmental 
values 349. 
5  Paterson, J.  Op.Cit., p. 301.  
6  Zyglidopoulos, S. (2002). “The Social and Environmental Responsibilities of Multinationals: Evidence 
from the Brent Spar case”, 36 Journal of Business Ethics 141. 
7  Higgins, R. (1993). “Abandonment of Energy Sites and Structures”, 6 J. En. & Nat. Res L.8. 
8  Paterson, J.  Op.Cit., p. 289. 
9  Higgins. Loc.Cit. 
10  Paterson, J.  Op.Cit., p. 290. 
11  UNCLOS 1982, Article 60(3). 
12  IMO, “Implications of the UNCLOS for the International Maritime Organization”, available at: 
http://www.imo.org/.../implications.IMO.pdf (accessed 15th March, 2015).  
13  Ibid. 
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The provisions of UNCLOS have been criticized for not being robust for the protection 
of the environment. Park, for instance, identified a number of interests that are relevant 
in addressing the issue of decommissioning.14 These interests are “the safety of 
navigation; fisheries; protection of the marine environment; and the imperative to 
search for and produce oil and gas”.15 He obvious that Article 60(3) of UNCLOS seems 
to have tilted the scale in favor of the oil industry because it permits the whole or 
partial abandonment of oil installations on the sea, an act that is inimical to the 
protection of the environment and other interests.16 
The IMO guidelines too, have not been helpful in ensuring the complete removal or 
decommissioning of oil installations. It provides that “where complete removal will 
involve unacceptable risk to personnel…or would involve extreme cost, the coastal 
state may direct that complete removal be dispensed with”.17 This means that “any 
coastal state or operator wishing to avoid complete removal of any structure has 
simply to declare that the cost of removal would be extreme and it is presumably let off 
the hook”18 even though the environment is worse for it. 
 
2.3.  London Convention (LDC) 1972 
The LDC places an outright ban on the use of some substances, while permitting the 
use of others.19 The convention groups various wastes into one of three categories in 
Annex I, II, and III (the Black List, the Grey List, and the White List respectively). 
Dumping of Black list wastes is prohibited.20 Dumping of grey list wastes is allowed 
upon the issuance of a special permit by the state concerned, while dumping of white 
list wastes requires prior general permit.21 Crude oil is categorized as Black list waste22 
except where it is contained as trace elements. Interestingly, LDC provides that: 
The disposal of wastes directly arising from or related to the exploration, exploitation and 
associated offshore processing of seabed mineral resources will not be covered by the 
provisions of this convention.23 
Article III (4) of the Convention defines waste as “material or substance of any kind, 
form or description”. Parmentier,24 has interpreted this provision to mean that the 
Convention does not cover the disposal or dumping of waste arising from exploration 
of oil, which includes offshore installations, meaning that they will be expressly 
categorized as falling into the definition of waste as exempted in Article III (1) 
paragraph A. 
                                                          
14  Park, P., Op.Cit. p. 15. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid, 16. 
17  Ighiehon, M. (1996). “The Abandonment Controversy and Environmental Protection”, 7 OGLTR 300. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Hollis, D. “Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972”, available at: http://www.eoearth.org/article/151448/#endnote_11 (accessed 20/03/2014). 
20  London Convention, Article VI. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid, Article III (1) (a)(ii). 
24  Parmentier, R. (1999). “Greenpeace and the Dumping of Wastes at Sea: A Case of Non-state Actors´ 
Intervention in International Affairs”, International Negotiation, 4(3): 7.  
P-ISSN: 2442-9880, E-ISSN: 2442-9899 
144 
 
 
2.4.  OSPAR 1992 
The OSPAR provides that no disused offshore installation or pipeline shall be dumped 
or left wholly or partly in place in a maritime area without a permit issued by a 
competent authority of relevant contracting party on a case by case basis.25 Where such 
a permit for dumping is to be issued after 1st Jan.1998, the contracting party shall notify 
other contracting parties of its reasons in order to make further consultation possible.26 
The convention has been criticized for giving contracting parties the room to maneuver 
decommissioning in favor of economic considerations even though it may be 
damaging to the marine environment. 
In the light of the lapses of these instruments in relation to protection of the 
environment, the Brent Spar incident has been credited with the introduction of some 
changes in the legal regime for decommissioning with emphasis on greater protection 
for the environment.27 However, an appraisal of these changes will show that they are 
largely cosmetic and did little to remedy the defects of existing instruments in relation 
to environmental protection. 
 
3.  The Brent Spar Episode and Post effects 
The Brent Spar platform used by Shell Company for the storing of oil in the North Sea 
became redundant in 1991.28 In May 1995, the U.K government gave Shell the license to 
dispose the platform in the Deep Water.29 Greenpeace, an environmental organization 
opposed the deep-water disposal of the Spar on the grounds that “the damage to the 
environment would be significantly greater”.30 In the end, Shell decided to go along 
with public opinion and settled for the re-use option, which tilted in favor of 
environmental protection than deep-water disposal.31  
Following main headings should be provided in the manuscript while preparing. The 
separation between main headings, sub-headings and sub-sub headings should be 
numbered in the manuscript with following example: 
 
3.1.  The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention 1972  
The 1996 Protocol, which came into force on 24th March 2006 to amend the LDC,32 has 
been credited with introducing the following changes in the framework for 
decommissioning in the North Sea as an aftermath of the Brent Spar incident. Firstly, 
the Protocol requires the parties to “protect and preserve the marine environment from 
all sources of pollution”33 and to take all practicable steps in line with their capabilities 
to prevent and eliminate pollution from dumping. Under the LDC, the basic provision 
is that so long as the dumping will not cause pollution it may be permitted, provided 
                                                          
25  Article 5(1) of Annex 111, (n 20) Ibid. 
26  Article 5(3), Ibid. 
27  Park, P., Op.Cit. p. 19. 
28  Paterson, J.  Op.Cit., p. 295. 
29  Zyglidopoulos., Op.Cit., p. 143-144. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Kirk, E. (1997). “The 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping Convention and the Brent Spar,” 46(4) 
ICLQ 958. 
33  Article 2 of the 1996 Protocol. 
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 3(2): 141-147 
145 
 
of course that it is not prohibited under Annex I. In contrast, the Protocol prohibits all 
dumping except for that allowed under its Annex 1.9 and those exceptions may be 
dumped only if a permit has been granted.34 In other words, the emphasis in the 
Protocol has shifted from “permissive” under the London Convention to “restrictive”.35 
Secondly, the Protocol provides that “particular attention shall be paid to opportunities 
to avoid dumping in favor of environmentally preferable alternatives”.36 Finally, it 
extends the definition of dumping to include abandonment.37 Not minding the 
seemingly robust nature of these provisions in favor of environmental protection, the 
Protocol is fraught with some lapses that make its provisions largely superficial. The 
Protocol provides that: 
The disposal or storage of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the 
exploration…and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources is not covered 
by the provisions of this Protocol.38 
It defines waste or other matters to mean, “materials and substances of any kind, form 
or description”.39 A combined reading of both sections would mean as argued by 
Parmentier40 that the dumping or abandonment of offshore oil installations is 
exempted from the auspices of these Protocol. This means that the Protocol is utterly 
irrelevant in relation to dumping or abandonment of installations arising from 
decommissioning of offshore oil installations. 
 
3.2.  OSPAR Decision 98/3 
The OSPAR decision adopted in July 1998 contain traces of the effect of the Brent Spar 
case in the following provisions. Firstly, the preamble recognizes “re-use, recycling or 
final disposal on land as the preferred option for decommissioning”.41 Secondly, the 
decision prohibits dumping and the leaving wholly or partly in place of disused 
offshore installations42 except if the competent authority of the contracting state is 
satisfied that there are significant reasons why an alternative disposal is preferable to 
re-use, recycling or final disposal on land.43 Such permission may be issued following 
an assessment and consultation with the other contracting parties in accordance with 
Annex 3. 
This particular provision, which form the crux of the OSPAR decision, has been 
criticized as being superficial and “a bad decision”.44 Firstly, the said paragraph 
“leaves a large amount of discretion in the hands of the individual contracting parties 
to determine the definition of significant reasons”.45 Annex 2 offers no definition of the 
phrase “significant reasons” but goes ahead to list different considerations, which shall 
                                                          
34  Kirk, E. Op.Cit., p. 33. 
35  Ibid. 
36  The 1996 Protocol, Article 4(1.2). 
37  Woodliffe, Op.Cit., p. 107. 
38  The 1996 Protocol, Article 1.3. 
39  The 1996 Protocol, Article 1.8. 
40  Remi., Op.Cit., p. 25. 
41  OSPAR Decision 98/3, Preamble. 
42  Ibid, paragraph 2. 
43  Ibid, paragraph 4. 
44  Bellamy, D., et al. (2001). “OSPAR 98/3: An Environmental Turning Point or a Flawed Decision”, 42 
Marine Pollution Bulletin, 2, p.90. 
45  Kirk, E. Loc.Cit. 
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be taken into account46 in assessing such circumstances warranting non-removal or 
partial removal of such installations.47 Interestingly, the considerations include 
economic aspects, which apparently involves cost. Annex 2 provides that the options to 
be considered for the assessment include “other options for disposal at the sea”.48 If 
then the arguments for and against dumping in a specific instance were to be evenly 
balanced, under paragraph 3, the contracting party could approve the disposal at sea if 
in her own opinion it is cheaper to do so even if it affects other interests like protection 
of the environment.  
Again, even where any of the other contracting party objects to the permit in the course 
of consultation in Annex 3 on grounds of protection of the environment, it would only 
have persuasive effect on the contracting party’s decision to issue such permit. This is 
because the competent authority of the relevant contracting party is only required to 
“consider…any views expressed by contracting parties in the course of consultation,”49 but is 
not bound to follow such views. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper has established that the Pre-Brent Spar regime of decommissioning in the 
North Sea Atlantic was not robust in the protection of the environment as voiced out 
by Greenpeace. However, the paper establishes that the changes made in the regional 
and international framework of decommissioning to remedy the existing gap were 
largely cosmetic as they gave individual states room to maneuver decommissioning in 
favor of their economic interests even though such decisions would have envi-
ronmentally damaging effects. 
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